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INTRODUCTION
Despite a multiplicity of judicial decisions throughout the
country, the line between religious and secular influence in education
has remained cloudy since the U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the
issue. 1 Perhaps because “[t]he task of separating the secular from the
religious in education is one of magnitude, intricacy, and delicacy,” 2
the courts have been cautious to draw hard lines on the government’s
interaction with religious institutions. 3 In recent years, the ambiguity
created by overlapping analysis has stretched to religious use of school
facilities and funds. 4
* J.D. candidate, May 2012, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., Government with a Concentration in Political Theory, 2009,
University of Virginia.
1
John Witte, Jr., That Serpentine Wall of Separation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1869,
1869–71 (2003).
2
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 237 (1948) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
3
See id. at 237–38 (stating that the complexity of religion in education would
turn any hard-line standard into a wall “as winding as the famous serpentine wall
designed by Mr. Jefferson for the University he founded”).
4
See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221
(2000) (holding that University tuition can be used to fund activities that advocate
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Throughout the nation, groups have targeted religious
recognition in the context of governmental operations. 5 Thus, a court
must act with vigilance when deciding whether to afford or deny a
specific group rights because the court’s decision ultimately may
implicate the group’s right to expression. 6 While the words
“Separation of Church and State” are not included in the Constitution,
this long-standing principle has shaped all levels of government
decision-making when religion enters into secular society. 7 The First
Amendment’s guarantee of religious autonomy has created a peculiar
labyrinth of standards that the government must follow to accord
religious groups fair treatment under the law. 8 While the Church and
State are fundamentally separate entities, both must co-exist and
inherently influence the community’s expectations. 9
The First Amendment states in part that, “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.” 10 While the Constitution prohibits Congress from
establishing a national church or taking any religious preference, its
broad language has begged many questions that the Supreme Court
has aimed to answer. 11 As a result, the Court’s application of the First
various beliefs); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
835 (1995) (holding that the University’s refusal to fund a religious newspaper
constituted viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment); Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (holding that a university’s denial of funding to
religious groups using an open forum constituted content discrimination); Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169, 192–93 (1972) (upholding a university’s right to exclude First
Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus rules or interfere with other
student’s education).
5
See, e.g., Southworth, 529 U.S. at 220–21; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822–23.
6
Witte, supra note 1, at 1871–72 (stating that separationism in Supreme Court
decisions has abandoned harsh application and avoided metaphors).
7
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Witte, supra note 1, at 1871–72.
8
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653–54 (2002); Rosenberger,
515 U.S. at 841.
9
Douglas Laycock, The Many Meanings of Separation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1667, 1673–74 (2003).
10
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S 263, 263–64
(1981); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 192 (1972).
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Amendment to specific instances has resulted in various
inconsistencies. 12
Expectedly, the Court’s application of the First Amendment in
the context of public education has resulted in significant
controversy. 13 With the proper rearing of our nation’s youth fixed as a
standard in the public discourse, religion’s role in education has found
an unsettling lack of direction. 14 Spirited debate has resulted about
when and where religious interjection is appropriate in various stages
of education. 15 Groups have targeted the use of school buildings and
funds for religious purposes, as well as religious expression by
practice or speech. 16 The Court’s inconsistent decisions have accorded
religious institutions an expansion of rights that seemingly cross the
“high and impregnable” wall that separates Church and State. 17
Like minority groups, religious institutions are protected by
virtue of the reasonableness standard and strict scrutiny. 18 The
standard forbids the government from denying religious institutions
equal funding or access to a forum where reasonable. 19 Rather than
excluding religious institutions from public venues, the Supreme Court
has recognized that the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause does
not trump religious organizations’ freedom of expression. 20 If the
12

Compare Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004), with Witters v. Wash.
Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488–89 (1986).
13
See Laycock, supra note 9, at 1667–70.
14
See Witte, supra note 1, at 1904.
15
See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 108 (2001);
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831–32. The Court has created several different categories
of State forums, as well as multiple degrees of scrutiny and analysis so that specific
cases come down to trivial differences of when and where State and religious
interaction can occur. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 843.
16
See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221
(2000); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 287–28.
17
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (stating that Thomas
Jefferson’s 1802 Letter to the Danbury Baptist Association reasoned that the
Establishment Clause required strict separationism).
18
See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010).
19
Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106–07.
20
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 724 (2004).
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government allowed a secular group access to a public forum, it must
grant the same access to a religious group. 21 Applying the
reasonableness standard, the Supreme Court has held that any speech,
including religious speech, cannot be discriminated against unless a
reasonable interest in creating a limited public forum exists. 22
The Supreme Court has attempted to define the boundaries
between religion and public education. 23 Through the adaptation of the
Lemon test, the Court established an overarching standard, which
mandates that schools not discriminate or deny access based on any
beliefs absent a reasonable justification. 24 This aimed to remove any
preference for one viewpoint over another.25 Such viewpoint
discrimination would deny all citizens the right to a neutrally-operated
government by favoring one group over another. 26 The Court has since
molded its analysis on public forum cases around the type of
discrimination in which the State engages. 27
The First Amendment’s guarantees of free speech, of free
religious exercise, and against establishment have made it nearly
impossible for the Court to take any hard stance on religion’s role in
education. 28 While schools have been afforded the ability to create
limited forums with specific purposes, they are also hard-pressed to
21

See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835.
Id.
23
See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221
(2000); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 263–64
(1981).
24
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (holding that a policy will
not offend the Establishment Clause if it passes a three-prong test: (1) The
government’s action must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) the primary effect
of the government’s action must not advance or inhibit religion; and (3) it must not
foster and result in “an excessive government entanglement with religion”).
25
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (holding that viewpoint discrimination is
an egregious form of content discrimination and that the government must abstain
from regulating any speech when the restriction is based on the message or
perspective the speaker is expounding).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Carl H. Esbeck, Five Views of Church-State Relations in Contemporary
American Thought, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 371, 401–02.
22
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avoid enforcing regulations on religious groups’ various forms of
expression. 29 Schools may define the purpose and uses of such forums
so as not to discriminate, but may not limit the discourse in which its
students engage. 30 However, these limited forums have created tension
when they restrict religious expression. 31
Moreover, the same analysis is applied to schools when they
fund student activities. 32 Be it university newspapers, speaker
presentations, or events by religious organizations, schools are
generally not allowed to deny funding because of a particular
viewpoint expressed by those organizations. 33 Such funding is subject
to the same limited forum exceptions as other public forums. 34 Again,
problems arise under the Free Speech, Establishment, and Exercise
Clauses when affording religious groups public funds. 35
Recent Supreme Court viewpoint discrimination analysis has
left federal circuits to question when religious recognition has
overstepped its bounds. 36 Some circuits have upheld state denial of
forums and funds when religious exercises rise to the level of
worship. 37 Alternatively, other circuits have allowed religious groups
access to forums when their meetings include group prayers, religious

29

See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 843–44.
See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001).
While these forums are still subject to scrutiny under viewpoint discrimination
analysis, schools may designate a forum’s boundaries so as not to violate the
Constitution, federal or state law, or its own rules and regulations. Id.
31
See generally Good News Club, 533 U.S. 98; Witte, supra note 1, at 1904.
32
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834–35.
33
See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S 217, 217
(2000); Rosenberger, 515 U.S at 824–25; Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 169–70
(1972).
34
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845–46.
35
See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 107.
36
See Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 780 (7th Cir. 2010); Bronx
Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 492 F.3d 89, 104 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Calabresi, J., concurring); Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1092 (9th Cir. 2002).
37
See Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891 (9th
Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7 (2008).
30
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speakers, and numerous other religious activities. 38 In many instances,
what has been found as religious worship or practice in one circuit is
interpreted as mere public activity by a religious organization in
another. 39
Such inconsistencies are exemplified in the recent Seventh
Circuit decision, Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh. 40 While the court
recognized the University of Wisconsin-Madison’s right to create a
forum for a limited purpose, 41 the court held that the university had to
provide identical funds to both religious groups and other student
groups. 42 In doing so, the Seventh Circuit muddied the line between
Church and State in public education beyond what is justified by
precedent, the Constitution, or history. 43
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Badger Catholic departed
from its previous decisions and misapplied the standards expressed by
the Supreme Court. 44 Moreover, numerous circuits across the country
have heard cases similar to Badger Catholic and have reasoned
differently. 45 Plainly, the decision chips away at the wall between
Church and State. 46

38

See Prince, 303 F.3d at 1093–94.
Compare Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 781, with Bronx Household of Faith,
492 F.3d at 100–01.
40
See generally Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d 775.
41
Id. at 780–81.
42
Id. at 779.
43
See Steven K. Green, Of (Un)equal Jurisprudential Pedigree: Rectifying the
Imbalance Between Neutrality and Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1111, 1119
(2002) (discussing the wall of separation between Church and State as defined by
Justice Black and Thomas Jefferson).
44
See Linnemeir v. Bd. of Trustees of Purdue Univ., 260 F.3d 757, 759–60 (7th
Cir. 2001) (academic freedom and states’ rights require deference to educational
judgment that is not invidious); Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 618 (7th Cir. 1992)
(mere compliance with the Establishment Clause is not a compelling state interest
that would warrant discrimination against a religious group).
45
See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 492 F.3d 89, 104 (2d
Cir. 2007) (Calabresi, J., concurring); Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1092 (9th
Cir. 2002).
46
See Witte, supra note 1, at 1870–71.
39
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In understanding the direction of the Seventh Circuit’s recent
divergence, 47 it is critical to understand judicial precedent as it relates
to Church and State and the First Amendment. Understanding the
evolution of Supreme Court jurisprudence, along with the purpose of
the First Amendment, is markedly important because they highlight
the overarching purpose of the Establishment Clause. 48
Additionally, it is imperative to understand the federal circuits’
current interpretations of the relationship between religion and public
education, as they highlight how the public in general perceives the
Supreme Court. 49 Coming to this understanding will provide insight
into the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in this area of law. 50
This Comment will examine both the implications and
potential shortcomings of the Badger Catholic decision. 51 With other
circuits broadening religious interaction in public education, the
Seventh Circuit’s holding in Badger Catholic was ultimately decided
incorrectly. 52
Because the Supreme Court has failed to provide a clear
standard for circuits to apply, decisions like Badger Catholic represent
an opportunity to provide clarity. 53 Until viewpoint discrimination is
more clearly explained, public funds and facilities remain in a
47

See generally Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d 775.
There is constant debate over the exact meaning of the Free Speech, Free
Exercise, and Establishment Clauses, stretching as far back as the drafting of the
Constitution and the Federalist Papers, which discussed the proper approach
American governance should follow. See Witte, supra note 1, at 1871. Recent
decisions have aimed to carve out an understanding that promotes neutrality of gift
and denial in relation to religion. See Green, supra note 43, at 1113–14. Generally,
the court aims to treat religious institutions in the same manner as it would any other
group. Id.
49
See Bronx Household of Faith, 492 F.3d 89, 92–106 (Calabresi, J.,
concurring).
50
See id.
51
See generally Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d 775.
52
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30
(1995); Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 914 (9th
Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7 (2008); Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1092 (9th Cir. 2002).
53
See generally Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d 775.
48
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nebulous state that burdens the Seventh Circuit as well as other
circuits across the country. 54
I. BACKGROUND
A. What is Separation of Church and State?
The difficulty in distinguishing between the establishment of
religion and facilitating its free exercise may be attributed to the
different understandings of what the Constitution confers through the
First Amendment. 55 In many ways, the Free Speech Clause, the
Establishment Clause, and the Free Exercise Clause are in constant
constraint of and contradiction to each other. 56 The government is
barred from the unequal recognition of religious institutions while
simultaneously providing these institutions the same expressive rights
that all citizens enjoy. 57 As such, it is difficult to determine whether
the government is merely providing a forum or funding to the citizenry
and when it is funding religious activity. 58
The line dividing Church and State is unclear because the
precedent does not follow one coherent path. Whereas a state cannot
supplement religious schoolteachers’ salaries, 59 it can provide public
transportation for religious school pupils. 60 The State can loan books
54

Laycock, supra note 9, at 1669.
Id.
56
Indeed, in Locke v. Davey, the Court recognized that there is an inherent
tension between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment. 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004). Nevertheless, such tension is relieved as the
Court’s interpretation allows some “room for play in the joints.” Id.
57
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Locke, 540 U.S. at 718.
58
See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 237 (1948)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“the task of separating the secular from the religious in
education is one of magnitude, intricacy and delicacy”).
59
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622–23 (1971) (holding that
Pennsylvania’s Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act violated the
Establishment Clause when it reimbursed salaries of nonpublic schoolteachers who
taught secular material, as well as reimbursed the schools for secular textbooks and
instructional materials).
60
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1947).
55
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to religious schools, but it cannot loan any supplemental material to
them. 61 Rather than providing a clear rule, these inconsistencies breed
confusion among the nation’s courts. 62 In many ways, the divisions
drawn by the Supreme Court were agonizingly trivial. 63 Nonetheless,
such decisions aimed to discern what separation actually meant in
society. 64
Separationism can be divided into three general categories. 65
As postulated by Carl H. Esbeck, separationist views can be classified
as strict, pluralist, or institutional. 66 While strict separationists would
command a completely secular state, institutional separationists
envision a theocentric state just short of a theocracy. 67 However, what
jurisprudence has created is a neutral and pluralistic separation
between Church and State. 68 Justice Black attempted to define exactly
what the separation meant to American society, with the government
barred from establishing a national church or selectively aiding or
preferring one religious group to another. 69
Nevertheless, Justice Black’s view has developed into a fiction
in actual practice. 70 The government has consistently funded various
religious institutions without any conflict with the Supreme Court’s
analysis of the Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses. 71 From
providing tax breaks to churches to facilitating religious activity in
public buildings, the government has not followed Justice Black’s
perception of religion’s role in government. 72 As such, the conundrum
61

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 624.
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995);
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 624.
63
See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 624.
64
Id.
65
See Esbeck, supra note 28, at 378–79.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 379 (dividing the separation ideologies into strict separationists, who
desire a secular state, pluralistic separationists, who desire a neutral state, and
institutional separationists, who envision a theocentric state).
68
Id. at 388.
69
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 12–16 (1947).
70
Green, supra note 43, at 1119–20.
71
Id. at 1120.
72
Id.
62
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of religious interaction with government is an overwhelming area
because it involves contradictions in interpretation, viewpoint, and
jurisprudence. 73 This problem is only magnified when a court focuses
on specific intrusions of religion into government activity. 74 In recent
years, courts have paid special attention to funding and facilitating
religious activity. 75 Regardless of the focus, the separation remains a
serpentine wall. 76
B. The Supreme Court’s Stance
Parsing through the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions dealing
with religion can be daunting. Perhaps because this is an
“extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law,” 77 the Court has
struggled to draw hard lines on how religious institutions and
government funding should interact. 78 Nevertheless, the Court’s
constant refinement of law and its understanding of the First
Amendment has provided some shape to the lingering questions. 79
In examining the government’s approach to funding and
facilitating religious activity, the Court has adopted an evenhanded
approach so as to neither affirm nor deny any religious group’s
position. 80 To a degree, the government is forbidden from stopping or
limiting religious expression. 81 However, the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause negates the government’s ability to foster these
activities. 82 Even so, the Court has recognized the division between
Church and State as something other than a complete barrier.83
73

See id.
See generally Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819 (1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
75
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835.
76
See Witte, supra note 1, at 1869.
77
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
78
See generally Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819.
79
See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270; Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 192–93 (1972).
80
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648–49 (2002).
81
See id.
82
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835–36.
83
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 41–44 (1947).
74
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Because religion is an integral part of American society and values, it
shapes how we understand the very question it aims to answer. 84 In
doing so, religion has gained many liberties, which in turn has created
a labyrinth of jurisprudence that precludes any possibility of clear
guidance for lower courts to follow. 85
Adding to the complexity of the relationship between Church
and State, public education provides a sensitive area where society
demands religious independence, yet such independence cannot
encroach on religion’s involvement in the student’s life outside
school. 86 In addressing the ability of religious groups to operate in the
public sphere, the Court has concentrated on the State’s purpose in
enacting its rules. 87
1. Tests in Development
In addressing the relationship between Church and State, the
Court has developed several tests that help to understand exactly what
principles the First Amendment aims to protect.88 Historically, the
Establishment Clause has been analyzed under the three-pronged test
developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 89 The test requires that government
action (1) have a secular purpose; (2) not have the effect of either
advancing or inhibiting religion; and (3) not result in government
entanglement with religion. 90 The Lemon test has become integral to
framing how public education and religious organizations must

84

Green, supra note 43, at 1118–19.
Id.
86
See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Witte, supra note 1,
at 1904.
87
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111 (2001).
88
See Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union., 492 U.S. 573 (1989)
(coercion test); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (endorsement test); Lemon,
403 U.S. 602 (Lemon test); Everson, 330 U.S. 1 (neutrality test); Ralph D. Mawdsley
& Johan Beckmann, Religion in Public Schools: An American and South African
Perspective, 204 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 445, 454 (2006).
89
403 U.S. at 613.
90
Id.
85
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coexist. 91
Recent Supreme Court decisions have attempted to guide the
federal circuits. 92 The Court analyzed situations based on whether the
government was discriminating against the viewpoint of certain
speech, or the content of that speech. 93 The Court has held viewpoint
discrimination as a more egregious form of content-based
discrimination. 94 Generally, the government is forbidden from denying
religious organizations access when the denial is based purely on the
propagated message. 95 Likewise, content discrimination is
presumptively unconstitutional due to its focus on the content of what
a group is saying. 96 Though these categories are markedly similar,
content discrimination has faced less scrutiny and has been found
acceptable in some situations. 97 Through this analysis, the Court has
aimed to prevent discrimination of a particular group based on its
views or actions, while allowing the government to set the parameters
for the time, place, and manner in which the speech is made. 98
Additionally, the Court has allowed the government to separate
religious and government activity by creating limited public forums. 99
While open forums require the state to provide full protection and
funding for all speech, a government institution that establishes a

91

See Mawdsley & Beckmann, supra note 88, at 455 (“While framed in the
context of government financial support for religious schools, the Lemon test has
been invoked in a wide range of religion cases to both prohibit and permit efforts to
accommodate religious beliefs in public schools and permit government support for
religious schools.”).
92
See Good News Club, 533 U.S. 98; Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
93
Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 108.
94
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
95
See id.; Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46
(1983).
96
See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273 (1981).
97
See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004).
98
See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (the
time, place, and manner test is applicable only to speech regulations that are content
neutral).
99
See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 278.
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limited forum for a particular purpose may regulate the use of that
forum. 100
Whether it is dealing with elementary schools or public
universities, the government must tread lightly so as not to overstep its
citizens’ rights as well as the rights of religious organizations. 101
2. Content and Viewpoint Discrimination
In many ways, content and viewpoint discrimination are
ambiguous. 102 Discrimination against speech is presumed to be
unconstitutional. 103 Likewise, the First Amendment is breached
whenever the government places financial burdens on groups because
of the subject matter of their speech. 104 Content discrimination occurs
when government intervention is based on a speaker’s actions rather
than the subject matter of his or her speech. 105 Generally, the content
of the speech being expounded cannot be the focus of governmental
prejudice. 106 Such regulations explicitly or implicitly presume to
regulate the speech because of the substance of the message. 107
Furthermore, the Court has developed the notion of viewpoint
discrimination, which constitutes a more egregious form of content
discrimination. 108 Viewpoint discrimination violations target the
specific ideology behind an opinion that the group or speaker is
presenting. 109 Such regulations are imposed because of a disagreement

100

See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2975 (2010).
101
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–29
(1995).
102
Id. at 828.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 843.
105
See Roman Catholic Found., UW-Madison, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Wis.
Sys., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1137 (W.D. Wis. 2008).
106
See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001).
107
Roman Catholic Found., 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1137.
108
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
109
See Roman Catholic Found., 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1137.
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with the particular position that the speaker expounds. 110 Thus, content
discrimination always occurs when viewpoint discrimination does, but
not vice versa. 111
The Court has examined situations where the government has
refused to fund religious groups under a Free Exercise analysis, as
well as situations where the government recognized religious groups’
rights under the Establishment Clause. 112
In Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District, a school district provided its facilities to community groups,
yet refused a church’s request to show religious films. 113 The Court
held that because the school district opened its doors to the public, it
could not refuse organizations merely because they were religious. 114
The school’s focus on the subject matter of the speech, rather than on
the manner in which it was being expressed, constituted viewpoint
discrimination. 115 Following Lamb’s Chapel, the Court attempted to
define the differences between viewpoint and content
discrimination. 116
Just as schools cannot close their doors to religious groups
merely because they are religious, they cannot deny them funding
where there are secular parallels to the activities that receive
funding. 117 Whether it is the printing and distribution of newspapers
on campus 118 or disbursement of federal scholarships to students
110

Id.
Id. (“Viewpoint discrimination is thus an especially egregious form of
content discrimination in which the government targets not just subject matter, but
the particular views taken on subjects by speakers.”).
112
Compare Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718–19 (2004), with Good News
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112–13 (2001).
113
508 U.S. 384, 389–90 (1993).
114
Id. at 392.
115
Id. at 391.
116
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30
(1995).
117
Id.
118
See id. at 845–46 (holding that the University’s refusal to fund a campus
organization’s publication, written from a Christian viewpoint, when other
publications from other viewpoints were funded violated the Free Speech Clause:
“[the University’s] course of action was a denial of the right of free speech and
111
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pursing religious training, 119 public institutions must maintain a
neutral stance on how they conduct their activities. 120
In Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of
California, Hastings College of Law v. Martinez, the Court held that a
publicly-funded law school’s anti-discrimination policy could be
evenly applied to all groups that it funded, including religious
groups. 121 There, a Christian society at the school barred homosexuals
from joining the organization. 122 Because this was in violation of the
school’s anti-discrimination policy, the law school denied the group
funding and access to its facilities. 123 The Court found that the
school’s policy was applicable to all organizations in the school and
thus did not single out the religious group. 124 In fact, the Court noted
that because the policy was so inclusive, it was impossible to contend
that it was discriminatory against any one group. 125 When a public
university implements regulations on a limited public forum, it can
decide the parameters of the content that that forum allows, but views
that fit within the parameters cannot be discriminated against. 126
Contrastingly, in Locke v. Davey, a student pursing a degree in
theology was denied a government-funded scholarship and contended
that this was discrimination in contravention of the Free Exercise
Clause. 127 The Court disagreed, reasoning that the Free Exercise
Clause and the Establishment Clause allow some “play in the joints
between them.” 128 While the government could not hinder the
student’s pursuits, funding his pursuits would amount to providing for
would risk fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion, which could undermine
the very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires”).
119
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002).
120
Id. at 649–50.
121
130 S. Ct. 2971, 2989 (2010).
122
Id. at 2979–80.
123
Id. at 2989.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 2993 (“It is, after all, hard to imagine a more viewpoint-neutral policy
than one requiring all student groups to accept all comers.”) (emphasis in original).
126
Id.
127
540 U.S. 712, 717–18 (2004).
128
Id. at 718 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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religious training. 129 The school was allowed to participate in its own
form of government speech by deciding the limits of what it endorses,
and what it does not. 130 So long as the institution is not evincing
hostility towards religion in its actions, it is not required to supply
funds or access to religious institutions merely because a secular
alternative exists. 131
The directions in Locke are not applicable across the board. 132
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, taxpayers challenged a scholarship
program that funded recipients who attended religious schools. 133 The
scholarship program aimed to allow parents and students the ability to
attend any school of their choice. 134 The Court held that the
scholarship program was not a violation of the Free Exercise Clause
because the program was neutral and provided funding to a broad class
of citizens. 135 The fact that the families directed the funding to
religious institutions was not unconstitutional. 136 As the school had
created an open forum for its students, it could not discriminate against
certain institutions merely because they support religion. 137 However,
the Court’s decision faced serious criticism because it appeared as
indirect preferential treatment for religion. 138 By providing funding to
parents who chose private religious institutions over public schools,
the separation between Church and State became a farce.139
The commingling of content and viewpoint discrimination
looks to be a mess of precedent. 140 Nevertheless, distinctions in their
129

Id. at 725.
Id. at 729–30.
131
Id. at 724–25 (the state had a substantial interest in not funding the pursuit
of devotional degrees).
132
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648–49 (2002).
133
Id.
134
Id. at 647.
135
Id. at 652–53.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 652.
138
Id. at 685 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139
Id.
140
Compare Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 717–18 (2004), with Zelman, 536
U.S. at 648–49.
130
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analysis exist. 141 The government “is not required to and does not
allow persons to engage in every type of speech”; content
discrimination is appropriate when the restrictions are “reasonable in
light of the purpose served by the forum.” 142 Conversely, viewpoint
discrimination is generally prohibited in open forums as well as
limited forums. 143 While the views of a speaker cannot be the basis of
State regulation, the Court has endorsed the idea that universities can
focus a forum on a specific, intentional purpose and regulate speech
that falls outside that content.144
3. Open and Limited Forums
In Lamb’s Chapel, the Court also addressed the issue of when a
government creates a forum. 145 There, a church sued a school district
because it was refused access to facilities to show religious films on
family values. 146 The Court recognized that the school district was
allowed to preserve property under its control and dictate its use. 147
However, because the school district did not intentionally define the
limits of the forum, thus creating an open forum, it could not deny the
church access because of its religion. 148
In Good News Club v. Milford Central School, the Court held
that a school conducted viewpoint discrimination because it refused a
religious youth club access to its facilities after school hours. 149 The
141

See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835

(1995).
142

Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001).
Id. at 107.
144
See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985).
145
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S.Ct. 2141,
2144 (1993).
146
Id.
147
Id. at 2146.
148
Id. at 2148. Though the Court recognized that there may be a compelling
interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation, an open access policy to the
forum allowed religious use of the property. Id.
149
533 U.S. 98, 107–08 (2001).
143
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Court rejected the school’s argument that granting access would be
government endorsement amounting to a violation of the
Establishment Clause. 150 On the contrary, permitting the school to
deny the religious organization access would be just as threatening to
the Constitution as allowing that organization access. 151 Critically, the
Court viewed the school as an open facility, rather than a limited
forum. 152 Just as in Lamb’s Chapel, a forum open to the public had
been created without intentional limits. 153
Moreover, a forum does not necessarily have to be a physical
space; funding can represent a metaphysical forum. 154 In Rosenberger
v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, the Court held that
there was no difference between a public school funding a physical
facility and giving students access to its funds to pay for activities. 155
The Court recognized that a university may appropriate public funds to
promote particular policies as it wishes, so creating a limited forum. 156
In order to do so, it need only intentionally create the forum and set
out its limits and purpose. 157 From that point, the forum is judged as to
whether its limits are reasonable in light of its defined purpose. 158
In creating a limited forum, the State must distinguish it from
the traditional or open public forum. 159 In that sense, the restrictions
that the government imposes on an open forum are placed under
greater scrutiny than those imposed on a limited public forum. 160 In
limited public forums, the government opens property for use by
certain groups and dictates its use. 161
150

Id.
Id.
152
Id.
153
See id. at 109; Lamb’s Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148.
154
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995).
155
Id. at 843.
156
Id. at 833.
157
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985).
158
Id. at 806.
159
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001).
160
Id.
161
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30.
151
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Additionally, there is another division between these two types
of forums. 162 While there is the traditional open forum, and the limited
public forum, there also exists a designated public forum. 163 In the
case of a designated public forum, the Court uses strict scrutiny to
ensure that the government does not unreasonably restrict speech in
the nontraditional space. 164 While a traditional open public forum
usually uses public spaces like parks and streets, a designated public
forum uses spaces that are not typically open to the public. 165
Deciding what type of forum a school creates is critical
because it changes the analysis under the neutrality test. 166 If a forum
is left open to the public, content and viewpoint discrimination are
subject to harsher treatment and the State’s restrictions are subject to
strict scrutiny. 167 Alternatively, a limited public forum’s restrictions
need only be viewpoint-neutral and reasonable in light of its
purpose. 168 Therefore, knowing whether a university has reasonably
restricted a forum is critical when deciding if its actions are
constitutional. 169

162

Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2983 (2010).
163
Id.
164
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985); see also Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 864 (7th Cir. 2008).
165
Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106. Universities and schools can fall into all
three categories, but generally, they fall into either a traditional open forum or a
limited public forum. See id. These spaces are usually open to and funded by the
public. See id. However, unless the school sets a purpose for its facilities, they are
presumed to be “nonpublic forum[s]”—property that “is not by tradition or design a
forum for public communication.” See Choose Life Ill., 547 F.3d at 864.
166
See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2983; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30;
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
167
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2983.
168
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
169
See Choose Life Ill., 547 F.3d at 864.
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C. Division Among Circuits
Not surprisingly, the lack of specific direction from the
Supreme Court has led to varying approaches on how to decide the
constitutionality of forum restrictions. While some circuits have been
more rigid in their understanding of what an open forum is and when
viewpoint discrimination actually occurs, opposing views still linger.
In Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Education of the City
of New York, the Second Circuit addressed the State’s refusal to permit
church use of school facilities for Sunday worship. 170 There, under
two concurring opinions, the court vacated the permanent injunction
enjoining the school district from enforcing its prohibition against
religious use. 171 The court decided that the State’s restriction on
worship was not viewpoint discrimination. 172 Because the purpose of
the Bronx Household was specifically for worship, it fell outside the
content of the school’s purpose and was properly denied. 173
In the Ninth Circuit case, Prince v. Jacoby, a high school
student brought an action against a school district because it refused to
allow a bible club the same benefits that it does to other clubs. 174
Namely, the club was given different access to school supplies,
audio/visual equipment and school vehicles. 175 The court held that the
different treatment of the bible club from other school-sanctioned
clubs was in violation of the First Amendment under Widmar. 176 The
school created a limited public forum and chose to give benefits to
groups; having done so, it could not restrict a group’s access to these
benefits based on the group’s views. 177 The court further held that
even if it were not an open forum, the State did not have unlimited
power to restrict speech, and any restriction had to be viewpoint170

492 F.3d 89, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2007).
Id. at 90–123.
172
Id. at 98–99.
173
Id. at 100–01.
174
303 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002).
175
Id.
176
Id. at 1091.
177
Id.
171
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neutral and “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum.” 178 Because the restriction against the bible club was based
purely on its religious viewpoint, the restriction was
unconstitutional. 179
In another Ninth Circuit case, Tucker v. State of California
Department of Education, an employee sued the State for a ban on
displays of religious material and religious advocacy by employees. 180
The court there held that such a restriction was unwarranted under the
First Amendment. 181 Again, the court emphasized that the State had
not created a limited forum and could not constitutionally restrict its
employees’ speech. 182 Although this particular case involved a state
employee and was subject to another type of analysis, 183 analysis
under viewpoint discrimination and open forum precedent was still
appropriate. 184 Pursuant to Widmar and Rosenberger, the court
decided that there was no “plausible fear” that the employee’s speech
would be attributed to the State and implicate the Establishment
Clause. 185 As such, the State’s ban was unconstitutional. 186
While the Ninth Circuit has recognized that religious
discrimination in open forums is generally not permissible, 187 it has
held prohibitions limiting religious organizations constitutional when
178

Id. The school officially recognized and allowed full access to “groups that
engage in any lawful activity which promotes the academic, vocational, personal, or
social/civil/cultural growth of students.” Id. at 1091–92 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
179
Id.
180
97 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 1996).
181
Id. at 1209–10.
182
Id. at 1209 (“[t]he government does not create a public forum by inaction or
by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional
forum for public discourse”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
183
The court decided that Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563
(1968), was the controlling analysis for government employee speech. Tucker, 97
F.3d at 1210.
184
Id. at 1211.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 1213.
187
Prince, 303 F.3d at 1074; Tucker, 97 F.3d at 1213.
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the State creates a limited public forum. 188 In Faith Center Church
Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, the court held that a library
constituted a limited public forum because the State intentionally
dedicated its property for expressive conduct. 189 The court set out the
different levels of scrutiny applicable to open forums, nonpublic
forums, and limited public forums. 190 In traditional public forums, like
streets and parks, the State can engage in content-based regulations
when it is “necessary to serve a compelling state interest and [when it
is] narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” 191 Regulation in nonpublic
forums is less demanding: restrictions need only be reasonable and not
enforced against the speaker’s view. 192 The court determined that the
library did not fall into either of these categories because the State did
not make the meeting room open for indiscriminate use; it excluded
use by schools “for instructional purposes as a regular part of the
curriculum,” as well as use for religious services. 193 Nevertheless,
pursuant to Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 194 there was a
distinction between religious activity and mere religious worship
devoid of any moral teachings. 195 As such, the court listed various
activities, like effective communication of a group’s goals, the
discussion of religious books, teaching, praying, singing, and sharing
testimonials as permissible. However, pure religious worship is not a
viewpoint but a category of content, and can be properly excluded. 196
It is clear from just these few cases discussing the boundaries
of limited public forums and its relationship to viewpoint
discrimination that the circuits are engaging in complex precedential

188

See Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 910
(9th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
189
Id. at 907.
190
Id. at 907–08.
191
Id. at 907 (internal quotation marks omitted).
192
Id. at 907–08.
193
Id. at 909.
194
See 533 U.S. 98, 108 (2001).
195
Glover, 480 F.3d at 913–14.
196
Id. at 915.
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weaving. 197 What is apparent is that when a State creates a limited
public forum, it is within its power to restrict religious activity like
worship. 198 While the government must allow some activity
“quintessentially religious” in nature, not all religious activity is
protected under the doctrines of neutrality. 199
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
A. Decisions Before Badger Catholic
The Seventh Circuit has addressed the issues surrounding the
Establishment Clause, religion in public institutions, and the scope of
forum creation in various recent cases. 200
In one instance, several churches challenged an ordinance that
restricted the use of land zoned for commercial and business uses. 201
The court looked to the motivation for the regulations and determined
that the city was not motivated by a disagreement with the churches’
message but rather was concerned with the effective use of land. 202 As
this was a viewpoint-neutral purpose and a reasonable restriction of
the land’s use, the court held that it was constitutional. 203
In Southworth v. Board of Regents of the University of
Wisconsin System, students challenged the mandatory activity fee that
the University imposed on grounds that such a fee amounted to

197

See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 492 F.3d 89, 92–93
(2d Cir. 2007); Tucker v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 1996).
198
See Bronx Household of Faith, 492 F.3d at 101.
199
See id.; Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111 (2001).
200
Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 864 (7th Cir. 2008); Christian
Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 865–66 (7th Cir. 2006); Civil Liberties
forUrban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 765 (7th Cir. 2003);
Southworth v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 307 F.3d 566, 580 (7th Cir.
2002).
201
Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 758–
59 (7th Cir. 2003).
202
Id. at 765.
203
Id.
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support for views to which they objected. 204 The court held that the fee
was reasonable and that the fund constituted a metaphysical limited
public forum. 205 Even so, the court held that the student government
that defined the parameters of the forum was not entitled to unbridled
discretion. 206 Instead, it had to develop specific and concrete standards
guiding its funding decision. 207 So while the court recognized that the
University could create a limited forum that could discriminate against
certain content, these limits would have to be spelled out
specifically. 208
The court also examined the application of neutrality in
Christian Legal Society v. Walker. 209 There, a student organization
sued a public law school after it was derecognized for excluding
homosexuals from its organization’s voting membership, citing that it
was entitled to free speech and free exercise of religion.210 The school
had a nondiscrimination policy that was concededly viewpoint-neutral;
however, the court questioned whether it was applied in a viewpointneutral way. 211 Although the court noted that denying recognition to a
student organization is a significant infringement, it still found that the
group showed a likelihood of success on its claim that the school
unconstitutionally derecognized it. 212 In doing so, the court recognized
that a student organization could be restrictive if found to be a limited
public forum. 213 Here, the court was concerned with the student’s
expressive rights. 214 Even with a viewpoint-neutral stance, it is

204

307 F.3d at 570–71.
Id. at 580.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
453 F.3d 853, 865–66 (2006).
210
Id.
211
Id. at 866.
212
Id. at 867.
213
Id. at 866.
214
Id. at 867 (the policy would significantly affect the organization’s ability to
express its disapproval of homosexuality).
205
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possible for a university to improperly restrict the activities of its
students. 215
Likewise, Doe v. Small addressed the use of public spaces by
religious groups. 216 There, action was sought to enjoin the display of a
religious painting in a park. 217 The injunction ordered by the district
court that forbade the painting was held overly broad. 218 The Seventh
Circuit determined that the park, as a public forum, must accept
religious speech. 219 By limiting expression, the State does not act
neutrally, but is hostile towards the religious groups’ viewpoint. 220
The court instructed that any restriction placed on the open forum
must be narrowly tailored. 221
In Choose Life Illinois v. White, the court addressed the
definition of public forums. 222 An anti-abortion group sought to
compel the State to issue “Choose Life” license plates. 223 After
deciding that license plates did not constitute government speech, 224
the court held that they were a limited public forum. 225 Because the
plates had not been open for general public discourse, the court
concluded that the State had not intentionally opened the
nontraditional forum for public use. 226 In the end, the court concluded
215

See id.
964 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1992).
217
Id. at 612–13.
218
Id. at 621.
219
Id. at 619.
220
Id.
221
Id. at 621 (“The district court’s order was not narrowly tailored because it
sought to eliminate the display of the paintings ‘by any party’ instead of limiting it to
the ‘evil’ of the City’s alleged endorsement of the painting alone.”).
222
547 F.3d 853, 864 (7th Cir. 2008).
223
Id.
224
Id. at 863 (“Messages on specialty license plates cannot be characterized as
the government’s speech. Like many states, Illinois invites private civic and
charitable organizations to place their messages on specialty license plates. The
plates serve as ‘mobile billboards’ for the organizations and like-minded vehicle
owners to promote their causes and also are a lucrative source of funds.”).
225
Id. at 864–65 (declining to qualify license plates as an open or designated
forum).
226
Id. at 864.
216
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that the government was allowed to restrict this area based on the
content of the message. 227 As it had restricted all license plate designs
that addressed abortion, rather than targeting only the pro-life view,
the government was engaging in content discrimination.228 The court
held this restriction reasonable in light of the plates’ purpose,
especially since the State evinced no hostility towards any particular
view. 229
Additionally, in Linnemeir v. Board of Trustees of Purdue
University, students sought to enjoin a play that a university was
presenting because it evinced anti-Christian beliefs. 230 Though the
court recognized that a university policy promoting a particular belief
would violate the First Amendment, merely allowing students to
choose a play and display it did not amount to endorsement. 231 The
court stated that just as a classroom is not a public forum, neither is a
university theater. 232 Moreover, it recognized the need for academic
freedom:
If an Establishment Clause violation arose each time a
student believed that a school practice either advanced
or disapproved of a religion, school curricula would be
reduced to the lowest common denominator,
permitting each student to become a ‘curriculum
review committee’ unto himself. 233
The court urged that educational deference and deference to State’s
rights are required so long as the action is not invidious. 234 Again, the
court recognized the rights that universities have in defining and
funding their actions. 235 This decision was criticized, as there was no
227

Id. at 865.
Id.
229
Id.
230
260 F.3d 757, 758–59 (7th Cir. 2001).
231
Id. at 759–60.
232
Id. at 760.
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id.
228
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evidence that the University allowed other theater groups to use its
stage, and its choice of one ideology and denial of others constituted
viewpoint discrimination. 236
These cases demonstrate the breadth of application that the
court has made in viewpoint discrimination and limited forum cases.
When the State acts against a religious group, or any group for that
matter, it must be motivated by something other than the group’s
views. 237 Moreover, when it creates a limited forum, it needs to
specify the limits of that forum, so it is readily identifiable which
content is not allowed. 238 It is also important to recognize that the
mere existence of a viewpoint-neutral policy does not mean that its
application will also be viewpoint-neutral. 239
B. Badger Catholic
Decided in 2010, Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh involved a
religious group at the University of Wisconsin and its attempt to gain
funding for its activities. 240 The school collects nearly $400 from each
of its students in order to provide for a variety of non-instructional
student services and programs. 241 These funds are made available to
qualifying student organizations, which include those that engage in
“expressive activities, concerts, some athletic activities, and
recreational activities.”242 Additionally, the fund’s purpose was to
“provide a source of funds to ensure that students have the means to
engage in dynamic discussions of philosophical, religious, scientific,
social, and political subjects in their extracurricular campus life

236

Id. at 767 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 765
(7th Cir. 2003).
238
See Southworth v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 307 F.3d 566, 580
(7th Cir. 2002).
239
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 865–66 (7th Cir. 2006).
240
Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 776–77 (7th Cir. 2010).
241
Roman Catholic Found., UW-Madison, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Wis.
Sys., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126 (W.D. Wis. 2008).
242
Id
237
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outside the lecture hall.” 243 In order to gain access to these funds,
student organizations must meet criteria primarily set by the student
government. 244 Moreover, the University stated that the forum was
developed to foster “dialogue, or discussion, or debate.” 245
In 2005, the University of Wisconsin Roman Catholic
Foundation (RCF) began to seek reimbursement from the school’s
fund. 246 Though the school expressed concerns about RCF’s
eligibility, 247 it eventually approved the group as a registered student
organization. 248 In achieving eligibility, RCF submitted to student
control and agreed not to seek funding for “masses, weddings,
funerals, or other sacramental acts requiring the direct control of
ordained clergy.” 249
Although by 2007, RCF was allowed to seek funding, the
University did not fund RCF’s activities in their entirety. 250
Specifically, the University concluded that it could not reimburse four
of RCF’s expenditures because they were for worship, proselytizing,
or sectarian religious instruction. 251 RCF provided a mentoring
program with spiritual directors for spiritual mentoring,252 a training
institute for the organization’s leaders to gain perspective on how to
talk about prayer, worship, and the Catholic faith, 253 a drum shield
243

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
245
Id. at 1134 (internal quotation marks omitted).
246
Id. at 1127.
247
Id. The RCF was not a recognized student organization originally. While it
later met the criteria under the student government’s mandates, it initially struggled
as it had members who were not University students. Id. Moreover, it was not
controlled by students but by the St. Paul’s Catholic Center and various religious
officials, including a pastor and bishop. Id. The organization was also in violation
because it did not allow non-Catholics to participate in its meetings. Id.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
The spiritual mentors included nuns and priests who would talk to the
students about anything they wanted to talk about for a half-hour. Id. at 1127–28.
253
These meetings included a variety of activities including masses, prayer, and
worship services. Id. at 1128.
244
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used in praise and worship bands, and the cost of a Rosary
instructional pamphlet that told students how to pray the Rosary. 254 By
the time the case reached the court, the University had also denied
RCF funding for a summer training camp that trained the
organization’s leaders and included several masses, communal
prayers, and worship programs. 255 Moreover, the University denied
funding for a program that brought nuns from Italy to Madison to meet
with the group’s students to advise them on their “path in the world”
and determine whether they should “be a priest, or religious, or . . .
married.” 256 While the school did not fund these activities, it still
funded the majority of RCF’s actions, including large and small group
discussion, education and service offerings, theater and choral
activities, and welcoming activities. 257
The district court determined that the fund that the University
created constituted a nonphysical forum under Rosenberger and stated
that such a forum was required to distribute reimbursements on a
viewpoint-neutral basis. 258 Likening the case to Rosenberger, the court
referred to the University of Virginia’s rejected argument that the
publications primarily promoted or manifested a particular belief in or
about a deity or an ultimate reality. 259 Just as that was considered a
limited public forum, so too was the University of Wisconsin’s
fund. 260 The court concluded that the University was entitled to adopt
reasonable content-based restrictions on the limited forum, but that its
current denials were too broad. 261 The court noted that merely labeling
types of speech as dialogue or worship was not dispositive of whether
the regulations were constitutional. 262 Instead, the University would
have to explain its choices in funding and needed to analyze the
254

Id.
Id.
256
Id.
257
Id.
258
Id. at 1129–30.
259
Id. at 1130; see Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 822–30.
260
Roman Catholic Found., 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1130.
261
Id. at 1133–34.
262
Id.
255
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specific content of each disputed activity, rather than rely on highly
abstract labels. 263
In Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. 264 The court
rejected the argument that funding prayer, proselytizing, or religious
instruction would violate the Establishment Clause. 265 Instead, it held
that because the University had decided that nonreligious counseling
groups were within the forum’s scope, it could not exclude religious
groups offering prayer as a means of counseling. 266 Furthermore, the
court did not agree that the University was allowed to make this
decision, whether or not the Establishment Clause required it. 267
Relying on Locke, the court stressed that the State’s program should
not evince hostility towards religion. 268 Though Locke noted that
schools could speak through their decisions about which programs to
support, such as having a department on philosophy but not theology,
the court held that the forum created by the University of Wisconsin
was not to propagate its own message, but to provide its students the
ability to speak. 269 The court concluded that the University cannot
shape Badger Catholic’s message by selectively funding speech of
which it approves, and not funding views of which it disapproved. 270
Because the University created a public forum, it had to accept all
comers within the forum’s scope. 271

263

Id. at 1134–35.
620 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2010).
265
Id. at 778.
266
Id.
267
Id. at 779.
268
Id. at 780; see Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 724–25 (2004).
269
Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 780. The court noted that this seemed like an
overly formalistic distinction. Id. Nevertheless, it qualified its holding because the
University of Wisconsin had previously told the Supreme Court that it would
establish neutral rules and not shut out any perspectives. Id.
270
Id.
271
Id.
264
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Overarching Problem
Religion in public education is much like Pandora’s box,
unleashing an area of the law that lends itself to excessive
complication and entanglement. 272 Regardless of the standard or test
applied by the courts, religion has faced a burden unlike any other
institution in American democracy. 273 Focusing specifically on
content and viewpoint discrimination, courts have struggled to apply
these seemingly straightforward tests. 274 In one instance, a court may
find that the government is acting constitutionally, while another court
may find activity of nearly the same nature unconstitutional. 275 Thus,
different circuits have reached markedly different results. 276
The Seventh Circuit’s holding, which determined what public
universities must fund, is perilous. 277 In an attempt to make the
situation clearer for government institutions, Badger Catholic
unnecessarily integrates Church and State. 278 Ironically, the goal that

272

See Witte, supra note 1, at 1904.
See Esbeck, supra note 28, at 371–72.
274
See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 492 F.3d 89, 99–100
(2d Cir. 2007) (finding a violation of the Establishment Clause where a church was
permitted to use school facilities for Sunday service); Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d
1074, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2002) (requiring a school to give bible club access to
facilities even though it conducted religious speech); Linnemeir v. Bd. of Trustees of
Purdue Univ., 260 F.3d 757, 759–60 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding no First Amendment
violation where a public university presented a student play that evinced antiChristian beliefs).
275
Compare Bronx Household of Faith, 492 F.3d at 100, with Prince, 303 F.3d
at 1093.
276
See Bronx Household of Faith, 492 F.3d at 99–100; Prince, 303 F.3d at
1092–93; Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 759–60.
277
See Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 782–83 (7th Cir. 2010)
(Williams, J., dissenting); Green, supra note 43, at 1118–19.
278
See Badger Catholic, Inc., 620 F.3d at 789 (Williams, J., dissenting).
273
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the Seventh Circuit hoped to achieve may end up working towards an
opposite end. 279
The problem stems from the constant battle between the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. 280 The tests
developed to handle the varying issues under each clause fail to
address the true complexity of the problem—resulting in the Supreme
Court’s inability to come to a clear answer. 281 Decisions like Badger
Catholic exemplify the inherent problem that American jurisprudence
has created for itself. 282 Whether with respect to funding or facilitating
in some manner, analyzing religion’s role in education under
independent tests developed for specific clauses of the First
Amendment belittles the magnitude of the situation. 283
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Badger Catholic placed an
unnecessary burden on the State and forced the government as well as
students to implicitly endorse various religious activities, regardless of
their own ideology. 284 By concluding that the forum in Badger
Catholic was an open forum, the Seventh Circuit missed the direction
of the law and misinterpreted the purpose of viewpoint discrimination
analysis. 285 What the University created was a forum for a specific
purpose and with concrete limitations. 286 These limitations were

279

See id. at 781 (the court aimed to define parameters that would enforce
neutrality towards religion).
280
See Green, supra note 43, at 1126–27.
281
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971); Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
282
See Green, supra note 43, at 1132 (“[E]venhanded neutrality is incomplete
as a constitutional doctrine because it fails to account for the other important values
that inform the religion clauses, such as protecting religious liberty and autonomy,
ensuring religious (and secular) equality, alleviating religious dissension, and
protecting the legitimacy and integrity of both government and religion. A focus on
neutrality, however, discounts these values of liberty, equality, diffusion, and
government integrity.”).
283
Id. at 1131–32.
284
See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 115 (2001).
285
See Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 781; Green, supra note 43, at 1135–36.
286
Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 783 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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publicly available and reasonable in light of the forum’s purpose and
the tenets of the Constitution. 287
Plainly, the Seventh Circuit’s decision failed to recognize that
public institutions have the ability to stop some activity and are
required in some instances to limit religious speech so that religion
receives no preferential treatment from the State. 288 There is a specific
distinction between the state providing equal access to all groups
regardless of their views and the funding and propagating of religious
worship and activity. 289 While the former is necessarily protected
under the First Amendment, the latter represents an unreasonable
encroachment. 290
In looking at where to go from here, the Seventh Circuit must
understand the true movement of its own law as well as how the
Establishment Clause was meant to affect religion. 291 What has
occurred here is but a tremor of what may come if other circuits follow
the same route. 292
B. Badger Catholic Detailed
The Seventh Circuit failed to recognize the University of
Wisconsin’s prerogative to create a limited forum and restrict access to
that forum based on the content of activities. 293 Specifically, the
University created the forum to foster discussion of philosophical,
religious, scientific, social, and political subjects.294 Moreover, it fully
287

Id.
See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 192–93 (1972).
289
Green, supra note 43, at 1131–32.
290
Id.
291
See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 865–66 (7th Cir. 2006);
Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 765 (7th Cir.
2003); Southworth v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 307 F.3d 566, 580 (7th
Cir. 2002).
292
See Green, supra note 43, at 1135–36.
293
See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of
Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010).
294
Roman Catholic Found., UW-Madison, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Wis.
Sys., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126 (W.D. Wis. 2008).
288
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funded dialogue and debate on these topics. 295 What it did not fund
was any form of worship, proselytizing, or religious instruction. 296 All
student organizations could access this fund so long as they stayed
within these limits. 297 In doing so, the University created a specific
limited forum. 298
However, the court stretched the tenets of neutrality to
demolish the barriers that the University created. 299 By requiring the
school to reimburse Badger Catholic on the same basis that it
reimburses other groups, the court missed the mark. 300 While facially,
this approach appears viewpoint-neutral, it degraded what these
activities actually were. 301 The court seemed to see no difference
between students mentoring students and students seeking advice from
nuns and priests. 302 However, there is a significant difference. 303
While one is a discussion and dialogue about various social problems
at a school, the other is religious instruction. 304 It is not far-fetched
that nuns and priests will be giving particular religious instruction that
cannot be rivaled by a secular counterpart. 305 By its very nature,
295

Id. at 1134.
Id.
297
Id. at 1126.
298
See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001).
299
See Green, supra note 43, at 1131–32.
300
See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995).
301
Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 785 (7th Cir. 2010)
(Williams, J., dissenting).
302
See id. at 779 (majority opinion).
303
Id. at 785 (Williams, J., dissenting) (“If religion, and the practice of one’s
religion, can be described as merely dialog or debate from a religious perspective,
what work does the Free Exercise [C]lause of the First Amendment do?”); see also
Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 492 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Calabresi, J., concurring) (“Worship is adoration, not ritual; and any other
characterization of it is both profoundly demeaning and false.”).
304
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (“Religion . . . provides . . . a specific
premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be
discussed and considered.”).
305
Roman Catholic Found., UW-Madison, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Wis.
Sys., 578 F.Supp.2d 1121, 1127–28 (W.D. Wis. 2008).
296
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religious mentoring is on a level fundamentally different from student
dialogue. 306 It represents a spiritual experience. 307 There is no
comparison between the two, and trying to draw congruence only
denigrates the value of religion. 308
All of the activity for which the University rejected funding
follows this same analysis. 309 A training institute for the
organization’s leaders that conducts mass, prayer, and worship
sessions is not equivalent to a normal organization’s leadership
training. 310 The same applies to the summer training camp that it
conducted. 311 These are exercises in religious devotion and
proselytizing, not mere training. 312
Moreover, the pamphlets that Badger Catholic distributes differ
significantly from the newspapers discussed in Rosenberger. 313 While
the newspapers were intended to give religious perspective and advice
on current topics, Badger Catholic’s pamphlets were instructions on
worship. 314 It instructed members on the rosary and how to pray it. 315
This is markedly different from evincing a religious perspective. 316
That the University funded all but 9% of Badger Catholic’s
activities also lends some insight into how specific its limitations
actually were. 317 The six activities that it did not fund plainly did not
306

See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
See Bronx Household of Faith, 492 F.3d at 102.
308
Id.
309
See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010).
310
Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 785 (7th Cir. 2010)
(Williams, J., dissenting).
311
Id.
312
See Green, supra note 43, at 1120–21.
313
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 826–27
(1995).
314
Compare Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 827, with Roman Catholic Found., UWMadison, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1128 (W.D.
Wis. 2008).
315
Roman Catholic Found., 578 F.Supp.2d at 1128.
316
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 827.
317
Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2010)
(Williams, J., dissenting).
307
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further the forum’s goals. 318 This was reasonable content
discrimination. 319 By forbidding worship, proselytizing, or religious
instruction, the University did not target religious views generally or
Catholicism specifically. 320 Instead, it forbade actions. 321 Presumably,
any group that might seek reimbursement under these categories
would be rejected. 322 The court attempted to liken Badger Catholic’s
activities to secular counterparts and missed the point of these
activities. 323
The court also incorrectly assumed that worship and
proselytizing are automatically religious. 324 It is just as likely that a
student group could form to worship and proselytize for a sports team
or a pop star. 325 These are categories of conduct, not religious
views. 326 The separation is only magnified by the unrivaled
equivalency that religion creates for itself. 327 That mass, prayer, and
worship are typically religious and hold no secular equal does not
mean that the actions amount to a viewpoint. 328 Instead, it
demonstrates the specificity that the University has created in its
forum. 329 Mentoring programs are not the equivalent of religious

318

Id.
See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269–70
(1981).
320
See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2990.
321
See id.
322
Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 785 (Williams, J., dissenting).
323
See id. at 777–78 (majority opinion).
324
See id. at 778–79.
325
See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111 (2001).
326
Id.
327
See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 492 F.3d 89, 102 (2d
Cir. 2007) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
328
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 826–27
(1995).
329
See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985).
319

265
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss1/8

36

Graves: Papa Don't Preach: <em>Badger Catholic v. Walsh</em> Muddies the

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 6, Issue 1

Fall 2010

mentoring because the latter incorporates a specific level of worship
and prayer outside the scope of the forum’s purpose. 330
Finally, the court ignored the academic deference that it had
previously exercised and the well-respected notion that the State can
preserve property under its control so long as the self-created barriers
are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.331 With scarce resources
available, the University is allowed to decide which projects and
conduct it wishes to fund. 332 It must merely block access to the limited
forum reasonably and without regard to viewpoint. 333 The University
is allowed to make hard decisions about its funding. 334 As such, the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Badger Catholic was wrong. 335
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had the chance to
protect the separation of church and state in Badger Catholic v. Walsh,
but instead misapplied the neutrality test and created further
ambiguity. Perhaps because the court misunderstood the facts of the
case or misinterpreted precedent, the University of Wisconsin is
unnecessarily required to fund religious activity that it never aimed to.
Rather than creating a more level playing field for participation by all
student organizations, the court mishandled Badger Catholic v. Walsh
and disregarded the high level of separation that the First Amendment
demands. Moreover, by equating secular tasks with quintessential
religious actions, the decision partakes in blanket assumptions about
330

Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2010)
(Williams, J., dissenting); see Bronx Household of Faith, 492 F.3d at 102 (Calabresi,
J., concurring).
331
See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2983 (2010).
332
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2998; see also Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 786–87
(7th Cir. 2010) (Williams, J., dissenting).
333
See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46
(1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981).
334
See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2998; see also Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at
786–87 (7th Cir. 2010) (Williams, J., dissenting).
335
See id.
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religious activity. Rather than clarifying the discussion of religious
funding in public education, the court’s decision merely adds to the
serpentine wall of separation.
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